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SUMMARY 
The  medium-term  outlook for  demand  for new  ships  ( 1newbuildings9 )  shows 
no  likely improvement  in the market  before  1985/86;  the  shipbuilding 
industry's problems  are not,  therefore,  about to diminish;  they might 
even worsen in the short  term.  Community  yards  are  affected by 
over-capaci~ like their chief competitors,  but also  face  other 
difficulties. 
The  market  situation is such  that capacity reduction alone  would not 
suffice to  solve the problems.  To  restore its fortunes  the  ~ndustry's 
lifeline,  considering previous  capacity reduction,  must  generally be 
qualitative adjustment;  above  all this means  improving its 
competitiveness  and profitability. 
Productivity improvement  is within  the  industry's capabilities;  it is 
observed that- more  than in the past  and  apart  from  measures  aiming at 
restructuring and at cutting capacity where still necessary- the 
industry must  concentrate  on more  extensive cooperation and  take more 
advantage  of the  Community  dimension;  this is with  a  view to,  in 
particular,  consolidation of the results of earlier restructuring. Policy guidelines for  restructuring in the  shipbuilding industry 
r.  The  crisis continues 
1.  The  world  market 
1.1  Persisting imbalance  of  supply and demand 
World  shipbuilding capacity is now  20  million cgrt,  of '..rhich  .). 5 million 
is in the  Cownunity;  this is after a  reduction in Japan  and  Europe  of 
some  30%  in terms  of facilities and  40~~ in terms  of  labour since the 
crisis began  some  ten years ago.  It is still about  4~t above  demand 
(14  million cgrt),  which might  even  drop  further in 1982  and  1983  (to 
12  million cgrt).  The  latest forecasts  show  no  recovery in demand 
until  1986  - and  a  slow  recovery even then - owing in particular to  the 
adverse  economic  climate  and  severe  over-capacity in the  shipping 
industry.  The  restoration of  supply/demand  balance may  also  be 
considerably hampered  by new  shipbuilding capacity in countries which 
are active recent  entrants to the  industry.  As  a  result, it is 
probable that  supply and  demand  will  not  be  back in balance until the 
end  of the decade. 
In addition to  suffering from  over-capacity - equivalent  to twice the 
Community's  aggregate  capacity and  almost  equivalent  to Japanese 
capacity - the market  is likely to be  affected by  changes  in the 
pattern of demand  which  seem  likely to be  detrimental  to European 
shipbuilding.  Since  the  slump  in demand  is particularly acute in 
respect  of tankers  and  bulk carriers,  which  are  the mainstay of Asian 
yards,  these will  increasingly turn to the more  sophisticated ships 
which at present provide most  of the work  of European yards,  so 
putting these under greater pressure.  And  should the  Community 
merchant  fleet  continue  to  be  eroded by outflagging (i.e.  by 
shipowners  exercising their freedom  to register their ships under 
lower-cost flags),  shrinkage of this market  may  affect the  European 
yards,  which sell about  65%  of their output to it. - 2  -
1.2  The  declining trend of prices 
Leaving aside  a  small  number  of highly sophisticated ships  P  prices are  an 
external fact::r  for  Suropee.n yards:  with their market  dominance  and 
curupe·;;i_ tivr.r;B:":.'l  the  J"ap.:.nese  yards~ together with the  highly competitive 
Ko.rean  yards,  determine  prices  on the world market  o  European yards  are 
therefore obliged to mz.,tch  these prices,  which  do  not  reflect their costs, 
and  the liifference is made  up in whole  or in part  from  public funds  o 
After hardeni21g slightly in 1980 prices have  begun  to decline again  as 
cumpeti tion between yards has  ir1tensified;  according to recent  information, 
Japar.~se  a.YJd  K·)rean  yards  are even  said to be  accepting some  .:rders  at  a  loss  o 
Exchange-rate ins-Gabili  ty too is reflected in relative price levels  and  hence 
the  WEf8  orders  flow,  sinne ships  are  usually priced in dollars on  world 
markets  o  I-t  has been  found  several times,  for  example,  that  a  weak  yen 
relative to the dollar causes orders to  flood into Japanese yardso 
Taking the  Community  aggregate,  reductions between  1976  and  1981  were  48%, 
in terms  of production,  and  40fo  in  the  workforce  (with variations between 
Member  States~  of COlll'Be) ~  Most  of these  reductions  and  jub  losses were 
concentrat~:~d in  aJ:>eas  vJhere industrial structures  are undiversified or 
declinin.go  There  :i.s  thus  a  very  acute  sensi ti  vi  ty to  economic  and  social 
developments in these  areas~  The  Commission  is keeping  a  close watch  on 
developments  in this respect  and t.Jill  gi'Je  in due  course precise information 
when it be<:mes  availableo 
are  g-1 ve:':  .':. 1  Annex  I  o 
The  salient features  of the trends in Member  States 
In  the  las~  ~wo years the rate of decline in the workforce has slackened, 
except  in Belgium,  Italy and  the  United Kingdom;  in Denmark the workforce 
actually grevl  e  :Between  1980 and  1981  only in Italy and  Jilelgium  was  there  a 
further reduction;  in Germany,  and in the United Kingdom  to  a  lesser extent, 
there was  an  increase. 
Accurate  dRt;a specifically relating to the  trimming of production facilities 
are  not  available.  The  rundown  of facilities in the  Community is generally 
estimated to be  about  30%,  but operational capacity in this sector depends  on  the 
level of the workforce  and  when  this is taken into  account  effective capacity 
has been  reduced  by  almost  40%• --- - ----------- . --- ---:-.=-~------;-----,-.---~----
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2.2  Competitiveness 
In  shipbuilding estimates  of  productivity  should  not  be  based  only  on  the 
statistical  relationship  between  output  and  labour.  Some  factors  which 
directly affect  shipyard efficiency,  such  as  the shortfall  in  wordload 
relative to capacity,  and  the  varying degree  of  inelasticity between 
the  size of  workforce  and  size of  workload,  may  give  a  false  impression 
of  the  performance  of  which  shipyards  are  intrinsically capable.  The 
varying  significance of  these  factors  obviously  has  an  impact  on  costs 
which  differs  from  case  to  case.  Even  though  the  industry in  the  chief 
competitors  of  Community  yards  also  suffers  from  a  gap  between  workload 
and  capacity, it is generally much  more  flexible  in  adapting to  the 
situation,  so  that  a  considerable  part  of  the  Community  shipbuilding 
industry is  below  the  level  of  competitiveness  of  its main  rival,  Japan, 
where  for  example  they are  introducing  robots,  whereas  in  the  Community 
overmanning  due  to several  constraints,  particularly in  the  social  field, 
still pushes  up  costs. 
All  these  things  create  an  increasingly pressing need  for  the  Community 
to  concert  and  coordinate  its  resources  in order to  restore  the  industry's 
efficiency.  This  will  be  a  means  of  combating at  the  same  time: 
(a)  the  waste  of  human,  technical  and  financial  potential; 
(b)  the  incompatibility of  defensive  action  by  the  individual  States  with 
the  Community  interest;  and 
(c)  the  unproductive  use  to  which  - in  varying degrees  - aids  are  put. 
With  regard to cost  factors,  differences  in  respect  of  materials  inputs 
do  not  seem  an  insurmountable  obstacle for  the  Community  industry,  which 
is chiefly  handicapped  compared  with  its principal  competitors  by  enjoying 
less  upstream  integration  and  less  component  standardization,  resulting 
in  higher  component  prices.  Hourly  labour  costs  iliffer  substantially 
between  Member  States;  on  the  average,  basic  wage  scales  are no  higher 
than  in  Japan,  but  social  security charges  are  higher  in  the  Community. 
It  is  hard to quantify the  impact  of this  difference  on  ship  prices; 
according  to  some  sources  it might  be  5-10%.  In  Korean  shipyards,  however, 
labour  costs  are  considerably  Lower  (Lower  wages,  limited  social  security 
and  Less  health-<m&-sa1ety-at-~Jor·k provision). - 5  -
Asian  yards  derive  a  number  of  benefits  from  their social,  financial  and 
political environment  which  can  not  always  be  gauged  but  do  help to  widen 
the  competitiveness  gap.  In  Japan  the  factors  in  play  include,  among  others, 
the  higher  number  of  hours  worked  in total  over the  year,  a  more  flexible 
attitude  towards  working  time,  lower  absenteeism,  the  hiving-off  of  certain 
activities to  subcontractors  whose  Labour  is  less  expensive  than  regular 
shipyard employees,  shorter  holidays  (often  not  taken)  and  easy credit 
for  ship  purchase.  In  parallel  to  those  factors  which  favourably 
influence  quotations  from  yards  in  some  third countries,  the  Community 
shipyards  profit  in vi2w  of their  location  from  certain advantages 
in their  relationship with  shipowners  in the  Community:  easier survey 
of  ongoing  work;  the ability to  have  modifications  made  whilst  work 
is  in  progress,  etc.  These  advantages  tend  indeed to be  most  important 
for  ships  of  advanced  technological  content  and  are only a  real  advantage 
if the  Community  shipyard  meets  its delivery date. 
2.3  Structures 
In  Europe  shipbuilders are  Less  integrated, either with  large  groups  or  each 
other,  than  in  Japan:  with  the exception  of  Italy and  ttle tMited Kingdom,  where 
almost  the  entire  industry is nationalized and  therefore  in  theory  an  integrated 
whole;  there  are  some  Links  with  the  steel  industry  in  Germany;  with  two 
large  industrial  groups  in  France;  and  with  the  shipowners  in  Denmark  - though  all 
this  chiefly applies  to the big  yards.  lhe  many  remaining  small  and  medium-sized 
shipbuilders  tend,  however,  rathef  toward3  individualism. 
The  main  line of  work  of  Community  yards  is the  building of  new  merchant  ships; 
their endeavours  to diversify since  the crisis began  have  resulted chiefly 
in  an  expansion of  warship  building  and  ship  repair;  their activities outside 
the  marine  field  have  been  slow  to develop- in  contrast  with  countries  Like 
Japan  and  Korea  where  such  things  as  oil- and  gas-rig construction  and  the 
building of  floating factories  have  expanded  far  more. 
The  nature of  the  crisis is  such  that  the  yards  worst  affected by  it are those 
designed to build  large, unsophisticated ships  <crude-oil  and  bulk  carriers>; 
there  are  about  ten  in  the  Community  but  they  employ  over  30%  of  the  industry's 
workforce. Ship  repair 
- 6  -
In  technology,  Community  yards  are  generally  well  placed,  although  in  some 
fields  Asian  yards  are  now  edging  ahead.  In  organization,  and  in  particular 
input  procurement,  standardization,  and  sales  and  marketing,  Community  yards 
-chiefly owing  to their individualism- lag  behind their  competitors  somewhat. 
2.4  Ship  repair 
The  last three  years  have  seen  some  increase  in  the  ship  repair  business,  the 
chief  sources  being  re-engining  (propulsion  conversion  for  greater  economy), 
'jumboization'  (enlarging existing ships  for  economies  of  scale)  and  ship 
conversions  for  compliance  with  IMO  safety  and  pollution-control  standards. 
Some  yards  have  been  able to diversify in this  way  to cushion  the  effects of 
the  fall  in  the  newbuilding  market.  At  present,  however,  the  ship-repair 
market  is deteriorating,  with  work  increasingly confined to  routine  maintenance, 
and  some  over-capacity  seems  to  be  developing.  This  situation might  last  for 
two  or  three  years,  after which  the  prospect  of  a  recovery  in  shipping  should 
yield  work  on  the  recommissioning  of  ships,  this  being generally done  ahead 
of  needs. 
1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982 
1  EEC:  turnover  1  385.7  1  287.7  1  161.09 1  278.66  1  467.15  1  732.99  -----·~-
(m  ~ l lion  ECU) 
Workforce:  --- 62  486  58  214  54  542  53  081  51  5142 
Ships  laid  3  up 
World:  21  231  --- 25  486  7  490  5  371  10  399 
<'000 grt) 
1 N·>t  including  Ireland. 
2Not  including  Greece,  where  the  Labour  force  numbered  6  331  in  1981. 
3 In  October  each  year. 
-..  .. _  .......... -..,.. 
35  292 
Sources:  Ship  repair:  AWES;  Ships  laid up:  Institute of  Shipping  Economics,  Bremen. - 7  -
The  Location  of  repair  yards  on  the  main  shipping  routes  and  close to 
the  busiest  ports  is a  big  factor  in  determining  how  much  business  they 
secure.  Moreover,  although  international  competition  may  not  be  very  intense 
for  minor  maintenance  or  repair  work,  it is stiff for  large  repair  and 
conversion  jobs.  In  the  latter field,  particularly for  re-engining, 
Asian  (particularly Japanese>  yards  have  often  been  the  most  competitive 
in  recent  years.  The  reasons  for  this  are  now  being  investigated in  greater 
detail. 
2.5  Situation in  areas  other than  shipbuilding  and  repair 
The  building of  oil- and  gas-rigs,  which  expanded  in 1979-81,  also  provided 
the  shipyards  with  some  scope  for  diversification.  But  the downturn 
in the oil  business  and  the  ongoing  world  economic  depression  have  put  the 
rig  market  in  the  doldrums;  the outlook  in this  area  hardly provides  grounds 
for  optimism. 
There  has  been  Little expansion  in  the  construction  of  floating  plant  (factories, 
etc.)  in  the  Community,  unlike  the  position  in  the  Asian  yards.  Diversification 
out  of  marine  work  is extremely difficult  and  there  is  little of  significance 
to  record.  Reliable  data  on  turnover  or  hours  worked  in the  shipbuilding 
industry are  not  available,  so that  these  factors  cannot  be  evaluated more 
precisely. - 8 -
Building of fishing boats  and pleasure craft is  i~  a  generally satisfactory 
situation.  It is usually done  by small yards  which specialize in this 
workt  so  that  the relatively good.  health of this  segment  of the market 
provides  no  relj_,o;,f  fo:r·  yards building seagoing ships.,  lilut  the fact  that 
these  branches of the industry  have  no  acute problems  does  not mean  that 
their future is assured;  it can  be if they exercise unremitting care to 
safeguard their strong points  and strengthen their structures in order to 
do  so. 
3.  ~~uation in the industry of the main pompetitors outside the Community 
3.1  Other  West  European  countries 
The  problems  are  of the  same  nature  as  those facing the Member  States, 
tho~\gh there may  be  variations in their severity.  Reactions differ greatly 
between countries:  some  have carried out  a  complete  "purge" of their 
shipbuilding industry  (Sweden);  others  tend to give it maximum  protection 
(Spain); most  try to  combine  the  two  approaches. 
Broadly speaking,  European  shipyards  out side the  Community  are  in the  same 
position as regards  competitiveness  as  those  inside it, though  sometimes with 
labour-cost  advantages in the  southern  countrieso  These  cou11tries  also  form 
a  common  front with the  Com.muni ty to face  J apanj within  OECD,  and  in  the 
Association  of West  European  Shipbuilders  (AWES),  which  represents the industry 
vis-a-vis the Japanese. 
Production 1976-81  (million cgrt) 
1976  1978  1979  1980  1981  Reduction, 
1976-81,  1o 
Community  5.1  3o5  3o0  2.4  2.7  48 % 
I 
Rest  of AWES  3.2  2.3  2ol  1.5  L7  I  45  %  I 
3o2  Japan 
The  Japanese  shipbuilding industr,y has  not  been  impervious  to the crisis: 
as  orders  slumped,  competition between yards threatened to have  adverse 
effects;  at the instigation of the  authorities the yards therefore took - 9 -
steps together to  adjust to the crisis,  in particular by reducing capacity, 
limiting utilization of the remaining capacity within  a  crisis cartel,  and 
holding prices o  :By  the  same  token,  Japan was  able to demonstrate  at 
international level that its conscience was  clear,  notably at  OECD,  where 
it discussed these questions with the  European  countrieso 
From  fiscal year 1982,  however,  the crisis cartel -which had  limited output 
from  the group of largest yards to  50%  of its maximum  pre-crisis level -was 
dissolved,  with the result that  all ita estimated 7.5 million cgrt of 
remaining capacity has  been  unleashed  on  the market • 
At  present official guidance  on  production and prices is tacit rather than 
explicit, but  the  Japanese industry seems  to be  acting with  a  degree  of 
restraint  by not  increasing its market  share  any  further,  though it is 
already no  less than  40J'a. 
3o3  Korea 
The  expansion of Korean  shipbuilding capacity is and  has  been rapid:  in 
just  a  few years it has doubled to its present  level of 4 million grtjyear 
and is planned to reach 6  million grt by 1986o  Production is also  climbing 
fast,  though  less rapidly - it was  about  900  000 cgrt in  1982  (1.4 million  grt) -
as  there were  problems  in  securing orders.  Estimated capacity utilization is 
50%•  The  Korean  industr,y has  considerable  advant~es in  terms of wage  costs 
but its productivity is still low.  After concentrating chiefly on 
unsophisticated ships  (tankers  and bulk carriers), Korean  yards are now 
turning towards  a  range  of more  sophisticated vessels;  for  example,  they 
recently won  a  number  of orders for  container ships with prices that  even  the 
Japanese  could not  matcho 
The  rise of Korea as  a  shipbuilding country brings it increasing responsibility 
for the development  of the crisiso  Talks  have therefore been  opened with it 
within the  OECD  Working  Party on  Shipbuilding and  at  Community  level. 
talks must  be pursued in greater depth  o 
II.  Community  initiatives for  accelerating restructuring 
Council  resolution  of  19  September  1978 
The  resolution  affirms the Member  States'  political commitment  to  the 
These 
rationalization of the  shipbuilding industry.  It confirms  the  need for - 10 -
restructuring the  sector without  losing sight  of the essential interests of 
the  Comrnl~nity  and.  it places  emphasis  on  the  prime  role of the industry itself 
in  thh~ .t'espect  1  as  v.rell  ~..._c;  on  the desirability of support  from  the  authorities, 
pa.r-t::Lcularly  as  regards  er.nploymer:t  where,  on  the one  hand~ it ahould  be  aiming at 
the creation of new  jobs to match  those progressively lost  and,  on  the other 
hand,  at  limiting the social consequences  for  those workers  affected by  a 
reduction in the industry's activityo  This  stand taken by the  Council in· 
its resolution still provides  an overall  frame  of reference  for  Community  action 
and  for assessing restructuring planso 
lo  Internal instruments  and procedures 
1.1  Fifth Directive  on  aid to shipbuilding 
Directive  81/363/EEC  on  aid to shipbuilding establishes  a  Community  discipline 
for the granting of direct  or indirect  state aids  to shipbuilding which is 
based  on  Articles  92(3)(d)  and  113 of the EEC  Treaty;  this discipline is 
intended to promote  the rationalization  and restructuring of this sector 
which has been seriously hit by the crisis. 
The  Community  enacted this scheme  to control public  aid to the industry in order 
(a)  to prevent distortions of competition,  which might  have  resulted in 
uncontrolled intervention,  and  (b)  to  ensure that  public  aid to  the industry 
should provide  support  for  the necessary restructuring.  The  Fifth Directive 
has worked reasonably well, particularly with regard to the degression of aids 
and to rationalization,  where  the  emphasis,  having been  put initially on 
quantitative aspects,  should  now  be rather directed towards  the qualitative 
aspects of seeking competitiveness  and viability. 
The  Directive has  had  less effect  on  "indirec111 aid,  e.g~ aid to  shipowners. 
It is chiefly in this field that  the discipline instituted by the Directive 
needs to  be  strengthened. 
The  implementation of the Fifth Directive has  enabled the  Community  shipyards 
to maintain,  thanks to the permitted state aids,  at  least  a  minimum  workload. 
Restructuring has  differed from  one  Member  State to another in both the amount - 11  -
and manner  of capacity reduction.  In  certain cases capacity was  reduced 
by shorter working hours rather than  redundancies.  Some  production  capacity 
has  been mothballed rather than dismantled.  Not  all Member  States have 
put into effect overall restructuring plans  aiming at  eliminating the  least 
vi  able yards  .. 
Generally  speaking,  restructuring as carried out hitherto,  has been 
insufficient, particularly in qualitative terms  and the competitiveness of 
the  Community  shipyards  has not  been substantially improved.  Some  Member 
States  are of the opinion that,  as far  as the extent of the reduction of their 
industry is concerned,  a  threshold has  been  reached which,  for various reasons, 
they cannot  readily consider crossing,  in particular as  regards  employment. 
1.2  Community  aids to fisheries 
This is an  interim scheme,  limited in scope,  designed  as  an  incentive for 
fishing-boat  owners to build or modernize certain types of craft 12-24 metres 
in length.  The  Council  has  decided to allocate  30 million ECU  to this action 
1  for 1982  • 
Between  1971  and  1977  assistance of this kind amounted  to  62  million  ECU  in 
respect of 347  vessels.  In the period 1978-81 the total was  66  million  ECU  in 
respect  of 1112  craft  (5o%  newbuildings;  the earlier period these  accounted 
for  almost  100%). 
Although  not  intended to help the  shipyards,  the  scheme  has  nevertheless  been 
of benefit to the  Community yards in question  - almost  all of which,  moreover, 
are  small or very small.  (Orders for fishing boats of 100 grt  and  over 
amounted to only 100 000 cgrt in 1981,-or 4%  of the total of 2.5 million cgrt 
ordered from  the  Community  industry). 
le3  Social Fund 
As  one  of the industries undergoing conversion,  shipyards  are entitled to 
priority for aids  from  the Social Fund.  The  Commission  approved  applications 
for aid  from  the  shipbuilding industry for  approximately 11.5 million  ECU  in 
1980 and 9.5 million ECU  in 1981. 
1Regulation  No  31/83,  OJ  L 5,  7.1.1983; - 12  -
A proposal put  up by the  Commission  in 1980 for  a  specific aid for  shipyards 
to  come  under the  Social Fund  - income maintenance for elderly workers  having 
to  leave the industry - has  not  been  approved by the Council. 
cost was  11 million ECU  over two  years. 
1.4  ERDF 
The  estimated 
The  ERDF's  impact  on  shipbuilding has  been  slight.  Aid  for  investment  in 
shipyards totalled 3.5 million ECU  in the period 1975-81. 
In  1980 the  Council  agreed to non-quota funds  being specifically allocated to 
regions particularly hard-hit  by the  shipbuilding crisiso  Some  regions  in 
the United Kingdom  were  designated for the purpose of actions.  Assistance 
envisaged is 17  million ECU  over  a  five-year period.  At  the  end  of 1982 
the  Commission  put  to the  Council  a  proposal for  a  second  series of actions 
comprising an  increase of the  funding of its existing non-quota schemes. 
This proposal comprises  a  doubling of funds for shipbuilding,  with  no  change 
in the regions benefitting,  whereas  the  scope of eligible operations will be 
extended  (SMEs;  economic  advisory services). 
The  Commission  emphasized in its Communication  to the  Council  on  "New  Regional 
Policy Guidelines  and Priorities"1  in particular that  regional policy must 
dovetail with other Community  policies. 
1.5  EIB 
Shipbuilding has  only made  a  limited use  of ELi financing.  Insofar as 
investments for this industry form  part of  an  adequate restructuring plan,  they 
will be eligible for Eli financing. 
1.6  !£! 
The  situation is comparable with  the  situation concerning the EIB  but  account 
should be  taken  of the specific priority to which  SMEs  are entitled for 
industrial financing from  the  NCio 
le7  Community  aids for restructuring 
The  proposal from  the  Commission  for using Article  3752  of the general budget  in 
1979  to  aid  shipbuilding was  not  taken up by the  Council.  As  part of the 
procedure for preparing the 1983 budget  Parliament  has  adopted  an  amendment  from 
its Committee  on  iudgets to modify the  former Article  772: 
1 
Doco  COM(81)  152  finalo 
2rn the  1983  budget  this action is headed  under item  7720. - 13  -
- Article 772  (new  article)  Community  aid for industry 
Item  7720  (former Art.  772)  Aid for certain crisis-hit industrial sectors 
Item  7721  (new  item)  Community  measures  for industrial modernization 
and  development  of less developed Member  States. 
There  are  at  present  no  appropriations provided  for  such measures;  they could 
become  possible if the budgetary authority were  to  decide,  in the  course of 
the financial year  and  following  a  proposal  from  the  Commission,  to provide 
the necessary funds. 
1.8  Financial  and other  support  for industry projects 
(a)  Community  part-financing of a  demonstration project  on  waste heat  recovery 
1 
from  a  marine diesel  engine  by  organic fluid  for  shipboard electricity generatior!~ 
(b)  part-financing under the  R&D  budget  of a  feasibility  stu~ on  a  wind-
propelled bulk carrier2; 
(c)  part-financing of  a  pilot  stu~ on  the possibilities for standardizing 
certain components3. 
2.  Instruments  and procedures in the external relations sector 
2.1  OECD  Working Party No  6  on  Shipbuilding 
This  Working  Party pl~s a  definite role in initiatives aimed  at moderating the 
effects of the crisis through international cooperation with  a  view to bringing 
balance into  them.  It is  a  forum  for meetings with our  other European  partner 
countries  and  Japan.  It has thus developed  into the  setting for detailed 
discussions between  the  Community  and  Japan. 
Working  Party are as  follows: 
Agreements  reached within  the 
0 
0 
General  arrangement  for the progressive removal  of obstacles to  normal 
competitive  conditions 
General guidelines for government  policies in the  shipbuilding industr.y 
Understanding on  export  credits for ships. 
1contribution:  400 000  ECU  (partially  rep~able in principle)  towards  a  total 
project cost of l  million  ECU  (recently decided upon  by the  Commission  and 
still to be finalized). 
2
350  000  ECU  contribution to  a  project costing 700  000 ECU. 
330  000 ECU,  which is half the cost  of the  study. - 14-
The  Working Party monitors the application of these  agreements  and trends 
in G'Upply  a-YJ.d  demand 9  and  rerviews  its member  countries'  policies  and 
meaeuresQ  It recently agreed to hold initial exploratory talks with 
South  Korea  .. 
But  for this dialogue the crj_si::.;  woulti in all probability h<:we  turned  :l.r.to 
far more  of a  free-for~all"  For  example  7  the pressures put  on Japan when 
its controls were  relaxed early in 1981  have  certainly contributed to its 
reswnption of tacit guidance for its shipbuilding industryo 
2o2 Hjgh-level bilateral consultations 
Consultations  on shipbuilding have been held so  far with the  USA~ with  no 
result;  with  South Korea- in a  preliminary way;  and  with  Japan~ this being 
one  of the subjects  raised by the  Community  in the bilateral consultations. 
The  increasing role of Korea in the  shipbuilding sector calls for  prompt 
extension of dialogue with it on the subject  o  OECD  Working Party No  6 
provides  a  forum  for thorough discussion of matters,  in support  of the 
bilateral talks with Japano 
2e3  International Maritime  Organization 
MemoTandum  of  Under~tanding on~ort State control  (of s~ 
The  International Maritime Organization  (IM0)1  is a  specialized agency of 
the United Nations  whose  task is to encourage the adoption,  world-wide,  of 
standards relating to maritime  safety,  efficiency of navigation,  and control 
of pollution from  shipso  With  this in view IMO  formulates  and  adopts 
conventions  and  reconunendations  which  are brought  into force  when  sufficient 
ratifications are received and then enforced by the  States in question,  the 
Organization itself having no  powers of enfoTCement o 
IMO  conventions  include:  the 1974  International Convention for the  Safety of 
Life at  Sea  (SOLAS,  in force  since 1980)  and  the  1978  Protocol to  SOLAS 
(in force since 1981),  and  the 1973  International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution by Ships,  as  amended  by the  1978  Protocol - MARPOL 
formerly  IMCO .. - 15-
(the required number  of acceptances  was  received by 1  October 19829  this 
Convention will enter into force  on 2  October 1983)o 
Under  these  conventions  tankers  wi  11  have to be  fitted l'li th segregated 
ballast tanks  (SBT),  or dedicated olea...l'l  ballast tanks (CBT),  and cru.de  oil 
washing  (cow)  and inert gas  systems  (IGS).  Various  combinations  of these 
systems  are required,  with varying time-limits,  according to  Whether  new 
or existing ships are  concerned and depending on their tonnage  and whether 
they are crude-oil carriers or product  carrierso 
On  26  January 1982  the Ministers  responsible  for maritime safety of fourteen 
:Ehropean  countries  (the  Community  less  I..u.xembourg;  Spain,  Finland,  Norway, 
Portugal and  Sweden)  approved  a  Memorandum  of Understanding on port  State 
control of ships which  lays  down  inspection procedures  for ships in the ports 
of :Wrope a  'Ihe  "!Vlemora.ndum  of Understanding became  operative on  1  July 1982. 
Each  signatory authority undertook inter alia to  ensure that  foreign merchant 
ships calling at ports in its State comply ;rith the standards  laid down  in 
a  number  of IMO  conventions  (including SOLAS  and  MARPOL)  and 
ILO  Convention  No  147  of 1976.1 
A Committee has been set up to harmonize  procedures  and practices,  develop and 
review guidelines for ship inspections,  develop procedures for the exchange 
of information,  and keep under review other matters relating to the operation 
and  effectiveness of the Memorandumo  The  Commission will have  a  representative 
on the  Committee. 
There  is a  general  agreerr:mt that while  the  work  necessary to  make  ships 
comply with the foregoing requirements  should not,  as  such,  provide  anything 
more  than a  small addition to  shipyard workloads,  the entry into force  of 
these  requirements  should result - in view of the massive  tanker surplus 
in the withdrawal  from  service of a  large number  of tankers  on  ~mich the 
owners  would not  consider it worth  spending the necessary money- or could not 
afford to  do  so.  The  outcome  should therefore be  an indirect benefit  as  the 
reduction in the over-supply of tankers will decrease  the  imbalance  of the 
market,  insofar as  withdrawals  from  service  axe  followed by decisions  to buildo 
1ILO:  International  Labour Organization.  ILO  Convention  No  147,  the 
Merchant  Shipping  (Minimum  Standards)  Convention,  relates in particular to 
manning,  social security,  accommodation  and  working conditions. 16  -
Once  the Memorandum  of Understanding  1  is put  into  effeGt it tvill be very 
difficult  for  enbctandard ships not  to be detected  (i.e. ships below 
interna,tional  standfl.rds,  particltlarl~? in respect  of safety and  living and 
working cordi  tions  on  board)~ 
A smal1  nmriber  of Etuopea:n  and  ;::~  few open-registry countries have  not yet 
ratified some  of the  conventions  to  be  enforced und.er  t.he  Memorandum. 
}Tevertheless  the Memora.ndrun  is 1;eing implemented and early results of 
in£pectio~~ are encouraging. 
3.  Cons~tations with  interes~~_parti~~-
There is a  regular  dialo~te between the  Commission  and the  industry.  The 
ru.m  is to  promote  convergence of approach  as  regards  firms'  adjustment 
actions  along the guidelines  laid down  in the  Council  Resolution of 1978. 
The  dialogue has  not  by  any  means  overcome  the industry's  reluctance to 
moderate its defensive attitude,  but it is helping to  make  industrial 
strategies more  coherent.  It could also  promote  closer cooperation. 
Consultations are held twice  a  year with workers'  representatives within 
the  Community  and  annually within OECD.  Information is  exchanged on how 
matters have  developed,  enabling both  sides to  set their course. 
Meetings  are held  v-ri th the  shipowners  as  the need arises.  They are helpful 
from  the technical angle.  The  shipowners have  so  far held back  when  the 
question has  been raised of their collaborating in a  policy to  support  the 
shipbuilding industry,  but  they could  be  prepared to  accommodate  to it 
should our shiplmilders become  more  competitive.  Closer cooperation between 
Community  shipowners  and  shipyards  should be  encouraged forthwith,  with 
such  aims  as to identify requirements,  both  qualitative  and  quantitative, 
optimizG  ship designs,  and,  more  generally,  to identify means  of better 
satisfying the shipowner as  a  customer. 
1 Signatory countries have  a  time-limit of three years for regularly inspecting 
25%  of ships using their ports. -17-
III.  Essential_r~gqirem~~for r~jructurin~ 
Tne  foregoing has  both  made  clear  the need to  step up  efforts to  adjust  to 
the situation and described recent highlights of problems  arising from 
developments  in the  shipbuilding industry.  Hence  the utility of  a  review 
(prompted by both  the Council resolution of 19  September  1978  and the  need 
for sound administration of the  Community  Directive  on aid)  of the priorities 
required for structural adjustment  schemes,  having regard also  to  the 
increase in efficiency that will result  from  cohesion of national policies 
and of company  strategies and  to the concern to  limit  social  consequences. 
The  following considerations  aim  essentially at updating,  in the industrial 
·field,  the  Commission's  action,  which  is mainly concerned with the 
management  of the  Directive on aid,  as  well  as  making the interested parties 
aware  of new  perspectives for action.  These points are  to  be  seen as  a 
basis for defining actions  and not  as  a  full programme.  The  Commission  will 
continue,  with the industry,  the task of devising appropriate actions in 
line with  the positions taken in this document. 
1.  Implications of capacity reduction 
The  severity of world over-capacity requires the  adjustment  of capacity in 
the Community.  This  should,  as far as  the  Community  industry is concerned 
and taking into  account  previous reductions in capacity,  be  qualitative 
adjustment  designed above all to  imp~ove competitiveness  and profitability. 
On  this subject the  Commission  shares the opinion of the  European Parliament, 
which,  in its resolution concerning the  extension of the  Fifth Directive on 
aid to shipbuilding "points out  that reductions in capacity in consequence 
of the policy for reorganizing the  shipbuilding industry in the  Community 
have been severe  (and)  considers it therefore vital for the tightening up 
of control over aid to be  accompanj.ed  by the  implementation of a  policy of 
modernizing and defending the  Community's  shipbui~ding industry".  In such 
an overall policy there must  be  limits to the pruning of Community  shipyard 
capacity,  given the strategic importance of having an adequate  shipbuilding 
capability and the social and regional  problems  this kind of contraction 
inevitably entails,  especially in present  circumstances. - 18  -
Even  though  as  matters  n0\.-7  stand capacity reduction is no  longer so  much  to 
the fore  in shipbuilding restructuring policy, it would be unhealthy to try 
to keep all the  Community's  shipyards at their present  size by substantial 
subsidies. 
However,  to  promote  the  Community  shipbuilding industry's  restoration to 
real competitiveness by  ensuring that its capacity is fully up  to  date  and 
viable, it may  well be that there will have  to be further cutbacks  where  not 
enough has yet been done  in this direction:  these  could help to  make  the 
remaining capacity more  competitive  following positive action including in 
parti~lar capital spending on modernizing and rationalizing production. 
Also,  the Commission  must  see to it that the effort put  into restructuring 
is fairly shared. 
In the present  depressed state of demand,  better productivity will  come  not 
so  much  from  increased production by the  remaining shipyards  as  from  cost 
savings  and higher-quality products,  the prime  conditions  for  renewed 
viability. 
Now,  for further selective reduction to benefit production costs,  the 
remaining capacity would  need to  draw extensively to itself orders which 
would  otherwise have  been spread over a  bigger capacity. 
In view of the state of the world market  and the disparities in production 
conditions between the  Community  yards  and their main third-country 
competitors,  such  a  switch  could only take place if market  compartrnentation 
among  Member  States were  done  away  with. - 19 -
~ 
As  the  purpose  of  restructuring is not  to bring  supply  and  demand.back  into 
balance  but  to  improve  competitiveness,  it  must  be  directed  to  scrapping 
obsolete  capacity  and  production  factors  with  definitely too  Little prospect 
of  achieving viability to  justify the  cost  of  keeping  them  going. 
Otherwise  the  Community  would  be  failing to take  action which,  where  it is a 
matter  of  consolidating the  competitiveness  of  the yards  remaining  in  operation, 
could  do  much  to  set  the  Community  shipbuilding  industry  on  its feet  again,  even 
though  it  accounts  for  only  a  small  part  of  the  supply/demand  imbalance  wor~d-wide. 
This  is primarily  a  task  for  the  firms  themselves,  though  authorities in  charge 
of  industrial  policy  should  not  hesitat~ to  encourage  them  should  they  be 
inclined to hold back.  An  alternative  to the  closure of production  facilities 
whose  retention  can  no  Longer  be  justified would  be  more  diversification. 
At  Community  Level  factors  could  usefully be  identified- with  the  cooperation 
of  the  other  interested parties- to  serve  as  yardsticks  of  shipyard viability, 
in  order to  get  a  clear  picture  of  the  restructuring effort, particularly where  • 
application  of  the  Directive  on  aid is  concerned. 
___  2.  Priority for  improving  competitiveness  and  productivity 
Ongoing  action  to  improve  competitiveness  and  productivity is the  best  way  of 
giving  the  Community  industry  a  long-term  future,  since it is operating at 
present  on  a  world  market  that  is out  of  balance  and  where  technology  transfer 
has  been  so  rapid  that  Europe  can  no  Longer  claim to be  pre-eminently the 
builder  of  technology-intensive ships. 
Industry itself has  the  prime  responsibility  for  shaping its own  destiny  and 
taking  such  steps  as  are  necessary  to this  end. 
To  consolidate the  results  of  capacity  r~uction requires  further  steps  to  be 
taken  by  the  surviving  yards  themselves  in  order to  improve  their competitive 
position  so  as  to maintain  or  strengthen their  market  position. - 20  -
Individual  efforts must  focus  on: 
(i)  production  facilities  and  methods:  their modernization  and  rationalization; 
optimum  use  of  workforce  and  existing expertise; 
(ii)  products:  innovation  and  technical  development;  preservation  (or  even 
enchancement)  of  our  technological  lead. 
But  it is not  only  a  matter  of  action to be  taken  by  each  yard  individually. 
Our  industry- made  up  chiefly of  small  and  medium-sized  firms  - is  faced  with 
competitors  (particularly in  Asia)  made  up  Largely of  highly diversified giant 
concerns  or  small  or  medium-sized  ones  operating  through  Trading  Houses.  In 
order  to  make  it a  fair  fight  individualism must  be  discarded  in  all  fields  where 
c0operation  can  help to  improve  the position of  our  shipyards. 
In  order to  improve  competitiveness  and  productivity the  emphasis  must  be  placed, 
beth  by  the  firms  and  their  representative associations,  on  the need  for  more 
coop~ration at  national  and  Community  level"  Priority must  be  given  to more 
~nergetic exploitation  of  the  opportunities offered  by  the  common  market,  with 
particular  regard  to  quicker qualitative adjustmeilt  to demand  and  to  the 
development  of  relations  with  Community  shipowners. 
The  benefits of  improved  cooperation  and  better use  of  the  Community  dimension 
in  terms  of  costs  must  be  sought  for  as  regards  training,  innovation,  sales, 
financing  and  purchasing  of  components.  In  particular: 
(a)  Specialization and  division  of  labour,  which  offer possibilities not  yet 
sufficientLy explored  for  improving  the  shipyard  performance,  can  nowadays  be 
achieved  only  on  a  group  basis  because  of  the  size of  firms  in  the  Community 
industryo 
(b)  Research  and  Development  should  be  undertaken  for  major  projects  on  a  joint 
basis.  However,  the industry's  Low  workload  tends  to  Limit  the  resources 
available to  individual  yards.  As  a  first  step,  more  coordination  of  R&D 
programmes  between  the  industry  and  the authorities and  joint  thinking to - 21  -
:o  ~del'jtify" new  fields  will 'avoid  duplicati-on·  ~~d- yi'eld··~~onomies of  s~ale 
thus  releasing  new  funds  to boost  R&D. 
(c)  More  standardizatio~ is  also essential'for  r~ducin~ p~oducti~n costs. 
3ought-out  i terns  are  so  important  in  shi pbui ld,i n.g  that  st:"andardi zati on  of 
both  compQnent$  and  manufacturing  processes  in the  yards  is needed. 
0  '  ~-- •  I  ~  •.:  'wo  ~} •1  •  '  ~ •  '  •  ·~ 
It is a 
k,ey  factor_ in ship  desj.gn  and  producti,on  cost  optimization  and  will  enable the 
..  .  • .  :, ....  •  ~  ----~ i.,i:  .  .  .  •  f  1,..  ' 
Community  industry to tender  for  group  orders  which  the  Community  (and  other) 
0_!  O  ~! \  ',  O  '  L  t:  0  _,  O  0  0 
shi pawners  currently place  with  Asian  yards  which  produce'·-a  better  response  to· 
,  •  ,  •  )  ,  1  •  - i  •  ,  '  .~: • I  /  '  ~ .;t  '. ·'  -
this type  of  enquiry.  If it is to produce  the desired  ~esults, stand3rdization 
must  be_conducted  by  the industry.i:self, using  systematic  procedures,  because 
.t  . .  \  .  ·r  .  , 
'tne'  ways  used  hitherto are too, slow  ~.even inflexible.' 
.··  . .  .  ...  ("'  .... 
.·;  .... 
(d)_Closercooperati.on  with  Community  shipowners _i.s  essential  to enable  the 
-· 
yards  to offer products  and  services  which  meet  these  shipowners•  needs  more 
closely;  it would  also create the  right  conditions  for  carrying out 
standardization  schemes. 
Since action  for  recovery  would  be  impossible  without  a  minimum  level  of  ,. 
workload,  the  authorities  must  strive to create a  climate  conducive  to improving 
the  workload _situation.  The  need  for.this  is all  the  greater because  most 
actions  described  require  investment,  which  means  that  funds  must  be  available 
and  that  while  they  are  Lacking  there  must  be  support  for  investment. 
3.  Restoration  of  normal  competitive  conditions 
In  this context, the  Commission  is willing to approve  national  investments  aids, 
to enable the  yards  to become  competitive  and  capable of  operating later without 
aid.  This  implies  that  the  Commission  cannot  consider direct  production aids 
to be  a  solution  for  the sector's problemsa  It  will  continue,  therefore,  to 
insist that  they be  abolished  as  soon  as  possible. - 22  -
By  way  of  a  follow-up  to the  resolutions  of  the  Council  (1978)  and  Parliament 
(February  1983)  on  the crisis  in the shipbuilding industry the  Commission  will 
also  continue  - with  the cooperation  of  interested parties - with  endeavours  to 
devise and  introduce  a  Community  maritime policy which  combines  the  needs  of 
commerce,  shipping,  shipbuilding  and  marine  engineering. 
Where  under  the  aforementioned  circumstances  capacity utilization  may  be 
dependent  on  direct  aids,  measures  to stimulate demand  for  the products  of 
Community  yards  must  for  preference be  envisaged.  They  will  not  promote  the 
building  of  tonnage  in  excess  of  requirements,  but  in  as  far  as  they  can  assure 
a  real  Community  preference they  can  open  up  the  market  at  Community  level. 
Thus  the  competitiveness  of  the  shipyards  will  be  enhanced  and  shipyards  and 
shipowners  encouraged  to close  ranks. 
It  is indeed  fundamental  for  the  sector  that  normal  competitive  conditions 
between  Community  yards  be  restored.  Aids  must  be  phased  out  and  at  the 
same  time  the  normal  working  of  the market  be  restored  so  that  selling prices 
reflect  production  costs,  in  order to encourage the  industry to  speed  up  either 
improvements  in their competitiveness  or  decisions  to move  into other  lines  of 
business. 
In  view  of  the  world-wide  context  in  which  the  Community  industry  has  to operate, 
however,  particularly the  scarcity of  orders  and  the  growing  over-capacity, it 
is clear that  a  Community  policy  for  shipbuilding  cannot  leave  external  factors 
out  of  account,  for  these  may  hamper,  or  even  partly nullify,  structural 
adjustment.  The  situation is worsened  by  the  fact  that  our  competitors  in 
some  cases  expand  capacity,  even  with  aids,  although  the  shipbuilding  industry 
in  non-European  countries  already  enjoys  comparative  advantages.  It  may, 
therefore,  still be  necessary to  accept  that  compensations  are  given  in  order 
to enable  our  yards  to align  on  world  market  conditions if our  non-European 
partners  for  their part  do  not  take  the  requisite measures  of  rationalization~ SHIPBUILDING  COUNTRY  BY  COUNTRY 
Trends  and  restructuring 1975-81 
1.  !_3~tgjum  (Output  and  order  intake in  '000  cgrt) 
ANNEX  I 
~=~of:___  ~--:~ 197!  __  :J-'--_19_79_-il;__.  _-_19_80  I  1981  __ 
1- Workf~rce  ___  ___J___)  ,6Jj-6_.i00 _  I  '193  I 6 523 ~ 
Output  170.0  I  165.1  I  124.8  I  119.6  9U 
,  Order  intake  j  62.0  j  59.4  !  270.0  ,  53.8  81.4 
L----··-·------------'·-----L------L.  L _________  J~ --
The  bulk  0f  the  shipbuilding  industry ccnsisted of  only  two  yards,  building 
medium-sized  to  large  sh~ps.  After  one  of  them  became  insolvent  in  1981, 
tile  Deigiar:  fiovernrr:f~ilt  prov·ided  l.ar·ge  sums  oi  money  for  ;;hips  under  constr·uction 
to he  c0mpleted;  it is envisaged that  th~se two  yards  wiLL  later be  merged 
into one  big  0ne,  with  maj0r  total  capacity  reductions,  though  only if d2mand 
should  justify that:  the  resulting en!.arged  yar·d  be  k~pt. 
Small  ships,  barges  snd  ~i;hing boats  are built  by  a  number  of  smatl  yards 
which  often  do  repairs  as  well. 
It'  r-et:ent  yeo:.u·s  Betgian···f~,J9  sh·ipping  companies  have  been  g·iven  Large  sums  in 
aid  for  ship  constructiona 
c.u  penmark  (Output  and  ;;rder  intake  in  '000  cgrt> 
Danish  shipyards  mostly  belong  to the  country
1s  shipowners  and  have  been 
restructured  without  stat~  eli d.  ·r·  ,ne  trend  since  the  start of  the  crisis 
has  been  towards  con~entration on  more  s0phisticated  ships  and  greater 
diversifitc:rdon  ;:;,·f  production. - 2  -
The  government  has  supported restructuring v1ith public-sector orders  and 
special  credit terms for Danish  shipoo.vners. 
3.  J.i'ra..Ylce  ( Ou.tput  and  order intake in '000  cgrt) 
-- ----------- --- -- ·--- ---- --- -
... 1981 ~  End  of  :  1975  1978  1979  1980 
Workforce  32.50(1  25  300  23  000  22  200  22  200 
Output  740.0  430.6  492,0  267.8 
I 
443.1 
J Order  intake  183.0  214.1  487.3  556~4  ;  332,9 
I 
Restructuring has entailed the  closure of a  nwnber of small  yards and 
concentration on  high-tecru1ology ships  by the  large yards. 
After the first  (pre-1977)  phase  of restructuring five  yards  remained 
whj_ch  were  capable  of building large  and mediwn-sized ships.  The 
government's policy has  recently resulted in their merger  into  t',IO 
separate groups,  ~r-Ti-th  a  big State holding in one  of them. 
There  is a  mul tiannual aid progra."'lme  designed to  support  the development 
of the industry. 
4·  Greece  (Output  and  order intake in  '000 cgrt) 
--------- -----
~d  0-;-:  ~75 
Work for 
Output 
Order  i 
ce~2  316  . 
ntake  0 
--- -- - --------
I 
-- -
1978  1979 
: 
I 
0 
I 
. 
.  . 
.  . 
-
1980  1981 
.  3  393 
0  5.0 
.  4.5 
Most  Greek  yards  build  only handy-sized  ships;  they also do  repairs. 
There is no  specific restructuring plan and  the  government  does  not 
provide aids for  shipbuildingo 
5..  Ireland  (Output  and  order intake in '000  CE,:rrt) 
I 
I - 3  -
The  only  firm  building  medium-sized  ships  has  been  in  trouble  ever  since 
the  shipbuilding crisis  began.  Restructuring,  with  the  aim  of  diversifying 
a  minimum  production  capacity,  has  been  supported  by  the  government  with 
a  smatl  number  of  ad  hoc  measuresm 
6.  Italy  (Output  and order  intake  in  '000 cgrt) 
I  En~-o~: 
I  . 
1975  1978  1979  1980  1981 
Workforce  25  000  20  000  19  000  18  000  17  000 
Output  480.0  305.2  248.6  345.5  359o 1 
t.~-~-de  ~-~-t-
ake  608.0  I  330.0  156.6  231.2 1  __  144.7 
-----·---~·----_____  .-J.. 
The  Itatian Part-lament  did  not  approve  a  restructLlring  plan  put  forward  in  1978~' 
so  that  the  industry  - mostly  State-owned  - went  through  a  long,  agonizing 
period  during  which  some  yards  were  closed  and  some  turned over  to other 
lines  of  work,  chiefly warships  and  oil- and  gas-rigs.  A new  plan  has  now 
been  adopted  by  Pa~liament but  not  yet  approved  by  the  Commission,  which  has 
reservations  about  certain  forms  of  aid being  provided  concurrently and  about 
the  extension  of  aids  to  ship  repair. 
?'J  NetherLands 
·~---- (Output  and  order  intake  in  '000  cgrt) 
Since the  crisis  began  the  Government  has  supported  the  restructuring of  yards 
buiLding  large  and  very  large ships.  The  industry  has  given  up  building very 
Large  ships  and  g~nerous aids  have  been  provided to facilitate the  closure 
of  the  rste~ant capacity  Hnd  enable  the  rema~ning  production  capacity to  be 
redirected towards  warships  or sophisticated ships,  and  ship  repair.  Production 
aids  have  also  been  given,  though  the many  small  yards  did not  receive  them  and 
a  number  of  these  have  also  been  closed. - 4  ~ 
8.  Feder·al  Republic  of  Germany  (Output  and  order  intake  in 
6000  cgrt) 
End  of:  1975  1978  1979 I  1980  I  1981 
---------------~--------~------,_----~~-----~------~ 
Workforce 
Output 
Order  intake 
46  839 
1  400.0 
821~0 
31  113 
1  029.0 
535.8 
26  369  I 
660w 71 
8os. 9 I 
I 
I 
24  784  26  521 
596.2  870.1 
613.0  871.1 
Restructuring  of  shipbuilding  has  been  undertaken  by  the  industry itself. 
Its  chief  forms  have  been  a  move  into  the  building of  high-technology  ships 
and  diversification.  A number  of  small  and"medium-sized  yards  have  had  to 
close  down,  although  in  general  yards  have  been  able  to  survive  relatively 
well.  The  Large  yards  are  often  part  of  major  industrial  concerns; 
nevertheless  they  have  been,  and  are,  in  severe  financial  straits, especially 
since the  end  of  the  short  period  during  which  the  Government  provided 
production aids. 
9.  United  Kingdom  (Output  and  order  intake  in  '000  cgrt) 
------------------------------------------~----------------------------------~ 
i 
I End  of: 
i 
r 
j  Workforce 
I ~~::~\  ntake 
54 
1975  1978 
550  lf 1  050 
760.0  718.4 
127.0  230.2 
1979  1980 
31  200  24  800  25 
579.9  458.5 
188.9  350.2 
Since  most  of  the  industry  was  nationalized  in  1977  there  has  been  a  big 
reduction  in British Shipbuilders!  production  capacity  in  terms  of  both 
1981 
345 
I 
I 
243.0 l 
41 Oa8 I 
I 
_j 
manpower  and  of  slipways  and  yards.  9ut  there  is  still a  threat  from  the 
shortage  of  orders,  resulting  in  inadequate  productivity.  The  Government  has 
therefore  not  yet  been  able  to  do  away  with  the  Intervention  Fund  which  provides 
production aids. 
The  Intervention  Fund  is also used  to  provide  support  for  Harland  and  Wolff  in 
Belfast,  which  is  in  an  even  worse  plight,  despite  having  been  cut  down  to  a 
fraction  of  its original  size. 1  BASED  ON  DATA  SUPPLIED  BY  MEMBER  STATES 
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